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 The Department of Defense manages one of the world’s largest real estate 
portfolios, maintaining 1,200 installations in the U.S. to support its mission of deterring 
conflict and protecting national security.  Safeguarding these installations is critical to 
mission assurance, yet Congress and the Department of Defense face an immense 
challenge in protecting coastal installations from impacts of sea level rise, a 
consequence of climate change projected to continue at an accelerating rate over the 
next century.  Sea level rise will continue to cause installation damage through more 
frequent and extensive tidal flooding, intensifying storm surge flooding, and land loss 
due to permanent inundation.  Two-thirds of mission-essential installations in the U.S. 
are vulnerable to this threat currently or in the future with the potential for billions of 
dollars required for infrastructure repair and replacement. This policy proposal offers 
that using consistent sea level rise projections and subsequent installation realignment, 
closure, or adaptation will prevent damage to military installations in the U.S. and its 
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Memorandum for Senator Tim Kaine, Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support (D-VA) 
From: Sarah Chapell  
Date: December 12, 2019  
 
Action-Forcing Event 
On April 16, 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC) sent a letter to General Joseph Dunford (USMC), Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarizing responses of senior Department of Defense officials 
when addressing climate change’s impact on military missions, installations, and 
readiness during numerous SASC hearings; none of the officials denied its harmful 
impact.  The letter requested the Department provide a comprehensive report on its 
actions to date to address the impact of climate change and concluded that the 
Department must decisively act to mitigate this threat.1   
Statement of the Problem 
Over thirty senior military officials, to include Former Secretary of Defense Jim 
Mattis, have in the past two years publicly labeled climate change as a “threat 
multiplier” for the United States in the current global security environment.2  Tangible 
effects of climate change, primarily impacts due to sea level rise, are present-day 
realities facing the Department of Defense and its major assets; this includes more than 
                                                          
1 Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Press Release, “Senator Warren’s SASC Hearing Questions Reveal 
Unanimity of Military Leaders on Climate Change as a Threat to Readiness,” last modified April 16, 2019, 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warrens-sasc-hearing-questions-
reveal-unanimity-of-military-leaders-on-climate-change-as-a-threat-to-readiness. 
2 Franceso Femio and Caitlin Werrell, “UPDATE: Chronology of U.S. Military Statements and Actions on 
Climate Change and Security: Jan 2017-August 2019,” The Center for Climate and Security, last modified 





1200 military installations in the U.S. that directly support force readiness, operations, 
and training; these include shipyards, airfields, training grounds, research facilities, 
family housing, and intelligence centers.3 A core mission of the DOD is to assess security 
risks and prepare rapid and effective military responses to those threats.  Despite this 
mission and the potential for billions of dollars lost due to permanently inundated 
infrastructure, the direct implications of sea-level rise on installations are not fully 
integrated into DOD threat assessments and planning. 4 
Worldwide recurrent flooding has increased in frequency by 300-900% over the last 
50 years, and this trend is projected to accelerate over the next hundred years resulting 
from increasingly more frequent and severe weather events in the United States and 
abroad. 5  Additionally, this recurrent flooding will become permanent for some lands, 
especially in coastal areas, due to global sea-level rise.  Twenty-three out of the last 
twenty-five years, the global mean sea level surpassed the previous year (at an average 
of 3 millimeters per year but accelerating), with the last seven years consecutively 
breaking its own record.6  These factors could cause severe DoD property and landmass 
losses, conditions that would damage military readiness and inhibit mission-focused 
budget execution on both a regional and global level.   
                                                          
3 The Union of Concerned Scientists, Executive Summary: The U.S. Military on the Front Lines of Rising 
Seas (July 27, 2016), 1 https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/impacts/sea-level-
rise-flooding-us-military-bases. 
4 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Military Installations and Sea-Level Rise, by 
Margaret Tucker and G. James Herrera, IF11275 (2019), 1. 
5 Rebecca Lindsey, “Climate Change: Global Sea Level,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 






The United States military responds to governmental and civilian requests for 
management support related to worldwide security issues through humanitarian 
assistance, conflict deterrence, and peace stabilization measures as they increasingly are 
directly triggered or strained by climate change.  Sea level rise due to climate change 
will potentially displace millions of Americans as over 40 percent of the U.S. population 
lives in a densely populated coastal area.7 However, DOD installations store and 
maintain the armed forces’ worldwide supplies and stocks and provide functional bases 
for national security purposes both domestically and abroad.  The Department’s 
capability to effectively respond to issues of national security related to or exacerbated 
by climate change is debilitated if installations and surrounding critical infrastructure are 
left vulnerable themselves to the effects of unavoidable sea-level rise. According to the 
Union of Concerned Scientists, continued sea level rise combined with a lack of 
mitigation measures will cause (1) more frequent and extensive tidal flooding, (2) land 
loss as some installation areas are permanently inundated and others flood with daily 
high tides, and (3) deeper and more extensive flooding due to storm surge.8  See figure 
1 for the substantial impacts to 13 out of 18 installations from sea level rise found via a 
recent Union of Concerned Scientists study.   
                                                          
7 Rebecca Lindsey, “Climate Change: Global Sea Level,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
last modified September 19, 2019, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-
climate/climate-change-global-sea-level 
8 The Union of Concerned Scientists, Executive Summary: The U.S. Military on the Front Lines of Rising 






Figure 1. Land Loss across Bases9 
 
The DOD holds a large share of the overall real property portfolio of the federal 
government, with over 585,000 facilities (buildings and structures) within 4,775 sites 
around the globe, 4261 of which are in the United States and its territories.10  According 
to an OMB study sampling 57,000 records from coastal federal facilities (majority of 
them being DOD-owned), 12,000 structures and facilities would be severely affected or 
inundated due to six feet of sea level rise scenario with replacement costs of $62 billion, 
which would inevitably result in severe cuts to military expenditures and operational 
readiness.11  
                                                          
9 The Union of Concerned Scientists, Executive Summary: The U.S. Military on the Front Lines of Rising 
Seas (July 27, 2016), 5 https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/impacts/sea-level-
rise-flooding-us-military-bases 
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Infrastructure, 
Base Structure Report – Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline (Washington DC, 2018), 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/BSI/Base%20Structure%20Report%20FY18.pdf. 
11 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget, Climate 






Effects of sea level rise are particularly severe for critical bases of U.S. territories in 
the pacific, where seawater corruption will limit supplies of potable drinking water while 
flooding will damage military technology with military and fiscal value beyond actual 
material building costs. A $1 billion critical Air Force radar installation was just 
constructed in 2017 in the Marshall Islands even though the land will likely be 
uninhabitable by 2030 due to these major challenges.12 The Department selected the 
location of the critical asset without incorporating these risks into decision-making.  
While the project has a reported lifespan of 25 years, accounting for sea level rise cuts 
that lifespan in half.  
Recurring flooding and rising sea-levels are not merely problems for DOD to plan as 
future threats; these issues are happening now and demand such attention.  Increased 
severe weather events in recent years have provided a small sample of the issues on the 
road ahead when it comes to impacts on military bases from storm surge flooding and 
inundation.  See figure 2 for specific examples of critical installation impact and damage 
due to sea-level rise.  The type and severity of damage depends on the elevation of the 
installation which demonstrates the assorted but widespread potential impacts and the 
urgent need to assess each installation. 
                                                          
12 The Associated Press, “Rising seas could threaten $1 billion Air Force radar site,” CBS News, last 





Figure 2. Contrasting Installation Sea Level Rise Vulnerability – The Importance of 
Place13 
 
In September of 2018, storm surges and subsequent rain from Hurricane Florence 
produced $3.6 billion in building damage and repair costs at Marine Corps’ Camp 
Lejeune in North Carolina.14  Another $4.5 billion is required to cover damages to 
Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, which suffered severe damages from Hurricane 
Michael in October 2018.15  The Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan had to 
submit a reprogramming request to Congress for the total value of over $9 billion as 
these disaster costs are not normally absorbed by DOD.16  These extreme weather 
                                                          
13 Heather Messera and Francesco Femia, Military Expert Panel Report: Sea Level Rise and the U.S. 
Military’s Mission (February 2018), The Center for Climate and Security, 22. 
14 Shawn Snow,”$3.6 billion price tag to rebuild Lejeune buildings damaged by Hurricane Florence” The 
Marine Corps Times, last modified December 12, 2018, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-
marine-corps/2018/12/12/36-billion-price-tag-to-rebuild-lejeune-buildings-damaged-by-hurricane-
florence/. 
15 Rachel S. Cohen,”USAF Expects to Need Nearly 1B for Tyndall Recovery in FY19,” Air Force Magazine, 
last modified March 13, 2019, http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/March%202019/USAF-
Expects-to-Need-Nearly-1B-for-Tyndall-Recovery-in-FY19.aspx. 
16 Aaron Mehta, “Memo: Pentagon delivers reprogramming request, seeks supplement for $9 billion 






events, exacerbated by continued sea level rise and climate change, demonstrate the 
potential fiscal impact to the Department for unplanned climate events.  
The Congressional appropriations process makes it much easier to react to major 
installation damage instead of adapting infrastructure to endure these occurrences, 
especially for gradual, long-term sea level rise.17 Current vulnerabilities to an 
installations are funded through the Facilities Sustainment, Maintenance, and 
Restoration (FSRM) account; yet according to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, 
Installations, and Environment Honorable Lucian Niemeyer, this account is underfunded 
year after year, with deferred funds totaling $116 billion going into Fiscal Year 2019.18  
Resilience of critical civilian infrastructure surrounding installations is also a required 
factor, yet many cities and towns cannot afford sea level rise adaptation costs, which in 
some areas like Norfolk, Virginia are estimated to cost over $1 billion, funds that are not 
readily available.19 As the impacts of sea level rise accelerate, the Pentagon has not 
made the responsible fiscal plans and decisions necessary to ensure that funds do not 
have to be pulled from other activities to cover installation damage from storm flooding 
or sea level rise, further deteriorating overall military readiness. 
                                                          
17 Li Zhou, “The disaster aid fight shows how unprepared Congress is to deal with the effects of climate 
change,” Vox News, last modified May 16, 2019, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/5/16/18617697/disaster-aid-senate-puerto-rico-trump-climate-change. 
18 Lucian Niemeyer, Statement Before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on 
Readiness, “Fiscal Year 2019 DoD Budget Request for Energy, Installations, and Environment, April 18, 
2018, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS03/20180418/108135/HHRG-115-AS03-Wstate-NiemeyerL-
20180418.PDF. 
19 Nick Sobczyk, “Group aims to ‘open up’ DoD grants for climate adaptation,” E&E News, last modified 




Additional challenges U.S. installations face when attempting to address these 
challenges include Department guidance on the use of climate projections and 
addressing sea level rise and climate risks to built infrastructure.  Out of 23 installations 
examined in a 2019 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 15 had 
integrated some considerations of climate change into planning documents and only 2 
installations had taken steps to fully assess impacts and address these risks as the 
Unified Facilities Criteria does not explicitly require a risk assessment specifically for 
these factors.20  Moreover, only 8 out of the 23 installations used climate projections, 
with DOD officials stating they “did not have the installation-level climate data from 
their military departments or from other DOD sources that they would need to 
understand the potential effects of climate change on their installations” and cited the 
need for additional DoD guidance on their use.21  Retired Rear Admiral Ann Phillips 
shares these concerns as a board member of the Center on Climate and Security, 
stating, "The challenge in the installation master planning process is that they still aren't 
using predictive flood mapping, they still aren't looking at what will happen to 
[installations such as] Naval Station Norfolk beyond 20 years.”22  Without these 
assessments and data availability, installations could potentially underestimate 
                                                          
20 Government Accountability Office, “DOD Needs to Assess Risk and Provide Guidance on Use of Climate 
Projections in Installation Master Plans and Facilities Designs,” GAO-19-453 (June 2019), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699679.pdf. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Nick Sobczyk, “Group aims to ‘open up’ DoD grants for climate adaptation,” E&E News, last modified 




potential damage to infrastructure due to accelerating sea level rise, thus insufficiently 
planning for these risks. 
History & Background 
While global sea level rise and the larger climate change threat was examined in 
the 1980s and earlier decades by various academic bodies, the national defense 
community initiated formal research on the topic in 1990 at the request of The Select 
Senate Committee on Intelligence (SSCI); this assessment came in the form of a report 
by the U.S. Navy War College calling for additional analysis and military preparedness.23  
The first explicit mention of climate change in the National Security Strategy was in 
1991.24   The Central Intelligence Agency in coordination with The Council on Foreign 
Relations and Senator Al Gore established an Environmental Task Force (ETF) in 1992 to 
enable scientists to use government global surveillance records and intelligence 
capabilities to study climate change, a program that lasted until the early days of the 
George W. Bush Administration.25  Robert Gates was the Director of Central Intelligence 
during the ETF establishment and later became the Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 
2011.   
Throughout the decade and into the early 2000s a plethora of studies on climate 
change implications on the U.S. military have been released by the intelligence 
                                                          
23 Franceso Femio and Caitlin Werrell, “Chronology of the U.S. Military and Intelligence Community 








community, the U.S. Congress, military services and schoolhouses, and academia.  
Nevertheless, throughout the entirety of the George W. Bush Administration climate 
change risks were not included in the National Security Strategy or any other strategic 
policies and programs.  This passive approach completely shifted from the start of the 
Obama Administration.  There is a dichotomy between the Democratic and Republican 
parties regarding the validity of the severe impacts from climate change depicted by 
scientists worldwide.  Figure 3 demonstrates that the issue continues to become more 
politicized over time with an increasingly divided perception of its security risk, adding 
further challenges to any policy plans for mitigation or adaptation. 
 
Figure 3. Percentages of American Respondents Saying that the Effects of Global 
Warming have Already Begun, By Party26 
 
 This politicization creates barriers to Congressional or Executive Branch action.  
For the Republican Party, admitting to the severity of climate change would 
                                                          
26 Elke E. Weber and Paul C. Stern, “Public Understanding of Climate Change in the United States,” 
American Psychologist, (May-June 2011), format retrieved from 




subsequently call for major regulatory changes regarding the current business practices 
of American corporations, the Federal Government, and all American households.  The 
party sees this as a direct conflict to its pro-business, small-government values.  
Moreover, pressure from advocacy coalitions representing the non-renewable energy 
sector amongst others serve as barriers to change, while conservative media and 
political figureheads deny the severity of the issue. Therefore, the Bush administration 
largely avoided confronting the issue.  While the Department of Defense continued to 
conduct studies, it followed suit with the Administration and focused on near-term 
threats to national security such as the post-9/11 global war on terror and wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.27 
 For Democrats, the issue is seen as an important one requiring significant action, 
yet little consensus remains on how to approach mitigation or adaptation requiring 
major policy changes.  The ongoing debates amongst Democratic Party leaders 
surrounding the Green New Deal’s general goals demonstrates this divide.28  Moreover, 
the American public for the past few decades until today does not view this as a top 
policy priority compared to health care, jobs, and the economy.29  However, the 
transition to the Obama Administration served as an opportunity to identify the severity 
of climate change within the intelligence and defense communities.  President Obama’s 
                                                          
27 Gary L. Gregg II, “George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs,” The Miller Center, University of Virginia, 2019, 
https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs.  
28 Benjy Sarlin, “What is the ‘Green New Deal’ and How Would it Work?” NBC News, last modified 
September 18, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/green-new-deal-how-it-works-
presidential-candidate-positions-n1044811  
29 Elaine Kamarck, “The Challenging Politics of Climate Change,” The Brookings Institution, last modified 




first National Security Strategy released in 2010 explicitly states “danger from climate 
change is real, urgent, and severe.”30  Climate change was subsequently included in 
Department of Defense strategic guidance. 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report was the first time the 
Department identified climate change as a risk to military operations and installations, 
under the leadership of Defense Secretary Robert Gates.  The QDR cites climate change 
as one of four priority areas for department reform, as it states, “DoD will need to adjust 
to the impacts of climate change on our facilities and military capabilities” and goes on 
to explain, “In 2008, the National Intelligence Council judged that more than 30 U.S. 
military installations were already facing elevated levels of risk from rising sea levels. 
DoD’s operational readiness hinges on continued access to land, air, and sea training 
and test space. Consequently, the Department must complete a comprehensive 
assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate change on its 
missions and adapt as required.”31   
Albeit a few years after the QDR, the Department released two documents that 
would prove momentous in setting up a framework to incorporate the risk of sea-level 
rise and climate change as part of its overall risk assessment and adaptation mission.  
These efforts were initiated by Executive Orders issued by President Obama.  The first 
EO released in 2009 titled Focused on Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and 
                                                          
30 The White House and Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington DC, 
2010) http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf  





Economic Performance mandated all federal agencies to develop sustainability 
performance plans.  And the second EO in 2013 called Preparing the United States for 
the Impacts of Climate Change directed federal agencies to provide the White House an 
assessment of necessary changes to land- and water-related policies, regulations, and 
programs that would improve climate resiliency.32  The first Department effort was the 
FY2012 and an improved FY2014 Climate Change Adaption Roadmap, a document which 
identifies several ways that climate change impacts the emerging security environment 
and prescribes broad measures the Department can pursue to address these 
challenges.33  These goals largely build upon and directly cite those identified in the 
2010 QDR and assigns the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment as the primary climate change adaptation planning official for the 
Department.  Although the Department has not fully implemented most of the outlined 
measures, has not met intended goals, or provided an update to this Roadmap to date, 
it still serves as a useful document outlining the significant scope of actions required 
from the Department.   
The second significant effort aligned with the 2013 EO was a Department of 
Defense Directive entitled Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience that assigns roles 
and responsibilities among DoD organizational entities and defense agencies regarding 
                                                          
32 The White House and Barack Obama, Executive Order 13653 Preparing the United States for the Impacts 
of Climate Change, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/01/executive-order-
prEPAring-united-states-impacts-climate-change  
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD FY14 Climate Change Adaptation 




climate change.34 It assigns the same primary adaptation official (now called the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment) along with 
additional duties to incorporate climate change adaptation and resiliency in the 
installation planning and basing process and advise the Unified Facilities Criteria 
Program to set appropriate military construction standards.35 
With the transition to a new Republican Administration in 2017, however, many 
of the Obama Administration efforts were rolled back.  Obama’s climate change 
executive order along with several other key Obama Administration climate change 
directives were rescinded by President Trump in March 2017 through his Executive 
Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth.36 The Department 
developed much of its climate change guidance to fulfill Obama era requirements and 
these documents are still in existence today.  New strategic guidance addressing climate 
change risk is clearly absent from the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National 
Defense Strategy.37 
 Despite the strong Trump Administration aversion to climate change action and 
guidance to federal agencies, the U.S. Congress has been able to use the annual 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) as a means to mandate the Department of 
                                                          
34 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, DoD Directive 4715.21 Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience,  (Washington DC, January 14 
2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/471521p.pdf  
35 Ibid. 
36 The White House and Donald Trump, Executive Order 13868 Promoting Energy Independence and 
Economic Growth, (Washington DC March 28 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/presidential-executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/  
37 Benjamin Haas and Mark Nevitt, “Two Notable Omissions in the Mattis National Defense Strategy, 





Defense to improve sea level rise risk assessments and specific adaptation efforts. The 
FY18 NDAA required the DoD to produce a report on the comprehensive effects of 
climate change as well as a prioritized list of the most vulnerable installations.  The 
former task resulted in the 2019 DoD Report on Effects of a Changing Climate, which 
states:  
Vulnerabilities to installations include coastal and riverine flooding. Coastal 
flooding may result from storm surge during severe weather events. Over time, 
gradual sea level changes magnify the impacts of storm surge, and may 
eventually result in permanent inundation of property. Increasing coverage of 
land from nuisance flooding during high tides, also called “sunny day” flooding, is 
already affecting many coastal communities.38 
The Department also partially fulfilled the latter requirement in January 2019 by 
providing a report on the installations most vulnerable to climate change.  The report 
did not rank the list of installations until an April 2019 addendum was added due to 
Congressional dissatisfaction with the initial report.39  It additionally excluded U.S. 
Marine Corps installations and all installations outside of the Continental United States, 
an omission of likely many sites highly vulnerable to sea-level rise.40  Moreover, this 
assessment only focused on current risks from climate change without incorporating 
                                                          
38 U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense, 
(Washington DC, January 2019), page 10,  https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/-
1/1/CLIMATE-CHANGE-REPORT-2019.PDF 
39 Paulina Glass, “Lawmakers Tell Pentagon: Revise and Resubmit Your Climate-Change Report,” Defense 






future risks with climate projections.  Yet even in this preliminary survey the 
Department found that two-thirds (or, approximately 66%) of the 79 installations 
addressed in the report are vulnerable to current or future recurrent flooding.41   
 The FY19 NDAA incorporated additional requirements to the Department for 
installation readiness, including mitigation plans for new military construction projects 
within the 100-year floodplain and including climate considerations in installation 
master plans and design requirements via Unified Facilities Criteria.42  While these are 
important steps forward for the Department, they only address new construction plans 
and not the thousands of existing installations.  Additionally, as a June 2019 GAO report 
identifies, the Department not only inconsistently includes climate change 
considerations in installation planning, design, and maintenance but also does not 
optimize its use of accurate climate projections to assess future climate risks as there 
are no specific requirements to do so.43 
 Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposed Climate Resiliency and Readiness Act, 
introduced in May 2019, was a sweeping proposal to provide dedicated funding for DoD 
climate resiliency efforts, would require Defense contractors to identify their own 
climate-related risks as they directly affect the defense industrial base and DoD supply 
                                                          
41U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense, 
(Washington DC, January 2019), page 10,  https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/-
1/1/CLIMATE-CHANGE-REPORT-2019.PDF 
42 John Conger, “U.S. Congress Addresses Climate Change and Security in Latest Defense Bill,” The Center 
for Climate and Security, last modified August 13, 2018, https://climateandsecurity.org/2018/08/13/u-s-
congress-addresses-climate-change-and-security-in-the-latest-defense-bill/. 
43 Government Accountability Office, “DOD Needs to Assess Risk and Provide Guidance on Use of Climate 





chain.44  Senator Warren proposed a very similar requirement in her 2018 Climate Risk 
Disclosure Act.45  This Act would also require the Department to create a climate 
vulnerability risk assessment tool and incorporate climate considerations in future base 
realignment and closure activities as well as strategic guidance.46 Neither piece of 
legislation was passed.   
 In 2019, while the Department of Defense has been partially successful in 
improving its resiliency to the threat of sea-level rise and wider climate change impacts, 
major vulnerabilities and policy gaps still remain.  The national security community 
largely sees this as a problem, although disagree on its level of importance compared to 
adversaries and near-peer threats like Russian and Chinese aggression.47  The 
Department continues to toe the line of strong politicization of the issue of climate 
change while climate projections and the Department’s own assessments continue to 
demonstrate sea level rise is a significant risk to fixed installations in the U.S. and its 
territories. 
Policy Proposal 
The goals of this policy are to assess 100% of military installations in the U.S. and its 
territories for long-term sea level rise vulnerabilities and that by 2030, zero assessed 
                                                          
44 Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Press Release, “Warren, Escobar Announce Legislation to Require 





47 Benjamin J. Hulac, “Democrats want to require Pentagon to study climate change risks on military 





installations will have land loss of 20% or greater projected for year 2050.  This policy 
will reduce the Department’s risk of diminished military readiness and fiscal exposure 
from sea level rise through the comprehensive integration of sea level rise projections 
into all military master installation plans, individual facility projects, and critical 
supporting civilian infrastructure in U.S. states and territories by 2024 and the 
implementation of a full Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round and installation 
adaptation measures by 2030 to address installations with 20% or greater projected 
land loss.  The Rising Tides Defense Resiliency and Readiness Act will enable the use of 
vetted climate projections across small, intermediate, and major fixed installations will 
ensure the accurate identification of those installations with the most mission-critical 
need of resiliency modifications for long-term planning and budgeting prioritization.  A 
BRAC round would serve as the mechanism to address fixed installations where 
modifications would be too costly or impractical while funding adaption projects would 
be pursued for the rest of the Department’s overall high-risk real estate portfolio. 
Policy Authorization Tool:  
Further climate resiliency should be amended in the FY2020 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), which will serve as the authorization tool of this policy. The 
NDAA is the mechanism used by historical precedent and the general legislative process 
to authorize the budget and expenditures of the Department of Defense through the 




worth of national security programs.48  This bill sets the guideline and limitation to 
defense appropriations bills for the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, 
authorizing specific funding ceilings.  The NDAA affects many aspects of Department of 
Defense programs anywhere between military construction to equipment procurement, 
military aid, personnel training, nuclear programs, and beyond.  The NDAA can affect 
many different sections of law (Title 10, 32, 22, 31 etc.) as the Department of Defense 
operates worldwide and with several federal agencies for complex and widespread 
missions.  Additionally, the NDAA has been passed every year since 1961 with few 
exceptions as a practical and symbolic demonstration of bipartisanship due to its 
importance for national security.49  Due to its broad scope of influence on the 
Department of Defense to include research and development, military construction, 
base realignment and closure, and funding authorizations, it is the most effective 
mechanism to address the described issues.   
Policy Implementation Tool:  
The provisions of the Rising Tides Defense Resiliency and Readiness Act are five-
fold: the development and required use of a sea level rise vulnerability and assessment 
tool; the incorporation of the assessed risk in DoD strategic guidance and the Mission 
Assurance Construct; the authorization of a new round of Base Realignment and Closure 
using sea level rise vulnerability criteria; a dedicated budget line item for sea level rise 
                                                          
48 United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Press Release, “SASC Chairman, Ranking Member 







adaption and mitigation project costs; and DoD funding authorization for cost-sharing 
with state and local governments for adaptation and mitigation projects of civilian 
infrastructure critical to supporting DOD installations.  
1) The development of a DoD-wide sea level rise vulnerability and assessment 
tool and its required use. 
Based on Senator Warren’s Defense Climate Resiliency Readiness Act, this sea level rise 
projection tool will be vetted and authorized for use by relevant Department installation 
planners and engineers.50  This modification of Title 10 USC section 2864 and section 
2802 shifts from requiring the use of any projection tool for master plans and projects of 
major installations, to a standard DoD tool to be used.5152  In addition to Warren’s bill, 
this policy will specify the tool will be used to assess the risk to existing or new project 
for its lifespan and will be required for intermediate and small installations as well (sites 
with a Plant Replacement Value (PRV) less than $2.067 billion).53 The Department of 
Defense will develop this tool and research and development will be authorized for two 
years in consultation with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Army Corps of 
Engineers, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and the Strategic Environmental 
Research and Development Program.  This tool will cost approximately $890,000 based 
                                                          
50 Senator Elizabeth Warren and Rep. Veronica Escobar, The Department of Defense Climate Resiliency 
and Readiness Act, May 15 2019, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Warren-
DoDClimateResiliencyandReadinessAct%20Section-by-Section%20Summary.pdf. 
51 Title 10 USC 2864, Chapter 169, Section 2864, Master Plans for Major Military Installations. 
52 Title 10 USC, Chapter 169, Section 2802, Military Construction Projects. 
53 Margaret Tucker and G. James Herrera, “Military Installations and Sea Level Rise,” Congressional 




on costs for a similar two-year project of the Northeast Regional Association of Coastal 
and Ocean Observing Systems, and will be funded through DoD base budget 
appropriations. 54  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Center will be responsible for administering 
and updating the Unified Facilities Criteria to implement the incorporation of this tool 
into project standards. 
2) The required incorporation of the threat of sea level rise to DoD critical assets 
into the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy, and the 
posture statements of Military Departments provided to Congress. 
This requirement is based on Senator Warren’s Defense Climate Resiliency Readiness 
Act.  The NDS is released approximately every four years, with the next expected for 
2022.55 Not described in Warren’s bill is that those risks identified in the NDS, NMS, and 
other DoD strategy documents provide the framework of risks to assess for the DoD 
Mission Assurance Construct, which provides comprehensive risk management to 
defense critical assets and integrates objectives into DoD strategic guidance, plans, and 
policies. 56  There are no direct costs associated with this action, although it would 
indirectly influence broad DoD programming and budgeting in future years.  
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3) Authorize a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). 
Adopted from then-SASC Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed’s proposed 
amendment to the FY18 NDAA, a new BRAC round would be authorized with changes to 
its statute, 10 USC section 2687.  This includes a $5 billion cap on the implementation 
costs, and the removal of the independent commission charged with reviewing 
recommendations from DoD to Congress.57  This calls for DoD to provide 
recommendations directly to Congress, with the Government Accountability Office 
validating DoD data.58  A modification of the original McCain-Reed proposal would 
explicitly add sea level rise to the judgment criteria, as the 2005 BRAC round only 
included the criteria related to this issue to include “(3) The ability of the infrastructure 
of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, 
and personnel. (4) The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to 
potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental 
compliance activities.”59  The first step after BRAC authorization is for DoD to conduct 
an extensive study on its bases with the outlined criteria, to include an inventory of all 
DoD real estate and incorporating a 20-year force structure plan, the duration of which 
could be up to four years.  After recommendation approval, DoD has six years to 
implement changes.60 
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4) A dedicated budget line item within the annual Department of Defense 
Budget Request for costs of sea level rise adaptation and mitigation to 
military installations, facilities, and their assets and capabilities. 
Adopted from Senator Warren’s Defense Climate Resiliency Readiness Act but modified 
specifically for sea-level rise, the DoD budget request would use sea level rise 
projections and strategic governance process in sections 1 and 2 to inform this decision-
making.  This requirement would be instated for the FY2021 budget cycle.  A 
requirement to use climate projections in this budgeting would not be included in this 
NDAA as the required sea level rise vulnerability and assessment tool would not be fully 
operational until approximately two years later. Nevertheless, as installation planners 
assess their installation requirements in the present defense budgeting process, there 
should be a dedicated line item for these modification costs for DoD and Congressional 
stakeholders to incorporate steady funds for these projects. 
5) The authorization of funds for a DoD cost-sharing mechanism for sea level 
rise adaptation and mitigation projects for local and state-owned community 
infrastructure critical to supporting DoD installations. 
Infrastructure surrounding a military installation owned by state and local government 
entities may still be critical to the support of the installation and therefore should be 
included in the risks assessment of sea-level impacts.  The Defense Community 
Infrastructure Program (DCIP) within Title 10 of Section 2391 should be authorized for 
$100 million through DoD’s Office of Economic Adjustment to provide grants to state 




for the same purpose. This authorization funding figure is based off of a request letter 
led by Representative Elaine G. Luria (2nd District, Virginia) to the Chairman of the SASC 
by members of the HASC and SASC that represent districts or states requiring these 
infrastructure projects.61 Section 2803 of the Senate version of the FY20 NDAA specify 
that assessing resiliency risks and threats to military installations must include 
community infrastructure projects and this should be included language in the DCIP 
statute. The current law requires the grant-receiving government to contribute 30% of 
each project cost which can be waived for national security purposes as necessary and 
this policy will maintain that percentage.62  
The 2024 timeline for conducting vulnerability assessments for all military 
installations in the U.S. and its territories is based on the two year estimate to develop a 
standard DoD sea level rise projection tool, another two years for its full inclusion in 
installation master plans and individual projects as well as defense keystone strategy 
and planning documents.  The complete implementation of the policy by 2030 is based 
on the estimated total of 10 years to complete a BRAC round and a 10-year funding 
timeline for adaptation measures.   
Policy Analysis 
This proposal calls for significant changes to the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2020 as it relates to climate projection technology, military construction, 
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strategic defense guidance, risk assessments, and budgeting to address the threat of sea 
level rise to coastal U.S. military installations.  The purpose of the proposed legislative 
changes are to assess 100% of military installations in the U.S. and its territories for 
long-term sea level rise vulnerabilities and that by 2030, zero assessed installations will 
have land loss of 20% or greater projected for year 2050.  The policy analysis is based on 
the assumption that subsidence of coastal areas and accelerated sea level rise will 
continue throughout the 21st century based on current climate projections, causing 
partial or complete inundation of land and its infrastructure on U.S. coastlines. The 
extent of impact is dependent on the geographic area of the installation’s coastline, the 
projected elevation above sea level of coastal lands, and the current infrastructure to 
address flooding or increased sea level at each site; however, based on preliminary 
assessments to include a 2018 Union of Concerned Scientists 18-installation study, some 
installations are projected experience 20% or greater land loss by 2050.   Proposed 
climate projections would have the assumed capability to identify impacts of sea level 
rise up to year 2100.  This analysis additionally assumes the Department of Defense 
would fully implement the described policy provisions.   
i. Installation Sea Level Rise Vulnerability Assessments 
The technical feasibility of developing a DoD climate projection tool based on 
current data is robust, as other federal tools already exist and are currently authorized 
in the FY19 NDAA for use by large installations to include those from the U.S. Geological 




National Academies of Science.63  Developing a DOD-wide projection tool would 
standardize the data used to assess installation vulnerabilities, ensuring uniform and 
accurate data.  The size of an installation does not always equate to military value, as 
seen through the aforementioned small site with a $1 billion critical satellite system in 
the pacific facing permanent inundation.  The proposal calls for this tool’s use not only 
at large installations, but small and medium installations as well in order to achieve 
100% installation assessment.  The cost of development is estimated at $890,000 with 
additional onsite-training at installations likely producing additional labor costs.  This 
price, however, is relatively affordable within the larger annual defense budget and the 
potential cost of installation damage due to the unavailability of accurate projections.  
When compared to the long-term plant replacement value of these installations due to 
sea level rise likely to surpass one billion dollars, the tool’s cost would provide an 
exponential return.  This technology development would enable access to a sea level 
rise assessment tool to installations that previously did not have the resources available 
for its utilization or an actual requirement for its use. Optimizing the accessibility of this 
data to all DoD installations enhances DoD technological capabilities and its equity.  
Nevertheless, DoD can only use currently available scientific research to establish a 
sea level rise projection tool and modify installations accordingly. Although it is clear 
that rising sea levels is a current reality, it will accelerate over the next century, and 
technological feasibility of projections exist, the exact sea level increases in these 
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projections are in fact estimates with the certainty of the assessment reducing with 
each succeeding decade.  The uncertainty of the rate and extremity of sea level rise 
leaves gaps in projection certainty that could lead to poor or incorrect decisions about 
the future vulnerabilities.  Therefore, while technical feasibility exists to produce 
necessary projections, DoD officials and Congressional legislators must accept the risk to 
policy implications from a level uncertainty in these projections as they project into 
future decades.  
Additionally, since consultation with science and weather-based federal agencies is 
required to develop a projection tool, it would be more efficient to instead create a 
single assessment tool for the entire federal government, a responsibility beyond the 
Department of Defense and the authorization tool (the NDAA) chosen for this policy.  As 
aforementioned, there are currently several sea level rise projection tools of the federal 
government. Pooling federal resources, capabilities, and expertise through an 
interagency effort instead would optimize the tool’s effectiveness in producing accurate 
projections and reduce redundant efforts of climate assessment, saving time and money 
for all agencies involved.  In short, the proposed DoD assessment tool does not achieve 
optimum efficiencies. 
Incorporating sea level rise into the DoD Mission Assurance Construct is a 
comprehensive mechanism for prioritizing and resourcing to protect critical 
infrastructure across the Department.  The Mission Assurance Construct used by the 
Department is defined as, “A process to protect or ensure the continued function and 




information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the 
execution of DoD mission-essential functions in any operating environment or 
condition.”64 Since sea-level rise will harm as many as two-thirds of installations and 
their assets within the U.S. and its territories, the Mission Assurance Construct is 
appropriate process for assessing the risk to core missions based on sea level rise 
projections.  Risk-informed decisions can be made regarding the prioritization of sea 
level rise installation adaptation requirements, therefore this would optimize the 
effectiveness in achieving the stated assessment goal of this policy.  
Part of the Department’s mission is assessing threats and responding to those 
threats rapidly, such as violence in the Middle East or disaster relief after an extreme 
weather event.  The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National 
Military Strategy direct the scope of long-term risks to be addressed in DoD planning 
and budgeting.  In April 2015, DoD released its Cyber Strategy where it announced cyber 
security would be included in the Mission Assurance Program and update relevant 
policy.65 As seen through this significant strategic shift, the Department has the 
administrative capacity to add additional factors to the Mission Assurance program that 
have widespread implications for the Department.  
While the threat of sea level rise could likely be added to the next set of these 
strategic documents with the Department’s extensive administrative capacity, the policy 
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and governance shifts of the Department based on this guidance can take several years 
to implement based on past implementation timelines.  For example, changing policies 
such as DoD Directive 3020.40 Mission Assurance in accordance with these strategic 
documents requires subsequent incorporation into Service-level guidance.  When the 
Department updated the DoD Directive on Installation Energy Management in March 
2016 to expand energy resilience and critical energy infrastructure requirements, it took 
until February 2017, nearly a year later, to include this guidance in Army guidance for 
subsequent implementation by Army installations.66 While this demonstrates that 
incorporating environmental engineering standards into policy to enhance resiliency is 
very possible, the timeline outlined for this policy goal does not consider these lengthy 
bureaucratic processes.  Therefore, the timeline of 2024 is unlikely, as it would likely 
take longer to implement the policy and execution provisions that lead to achieving this 
policy goal.   
ii. Eradicating installation vulnerability of 20% or greater land loss  
The aforementioned planning measures attempt to provide a comprehensive risk 
assessment on mission assurance and fiscal exposure to improve the readiness of 
installations to increased flooding and encroachment due to sea level rise.  However, 
the cost of protecting infrastructure and military readiness at some installations in the 
U.S. may not be in the best interest of the Department, particularly for those 
installations that are within the 100 year floodplain and estimated to experience 
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significant land loss and permanent inundation due to location vulnerability.  And with 
the continuous backlog of installation FSRM funding, many installations and their 
infrastructure have a lifespan that continues to be extended; for instance, the Navy’s 
production shops across four shipyards examined by GAO have an average age of 76 
with a substandard condition rate including several deficiencies.67  The authorization 
and subsequent establishment of a new BRAC would eliminate or realign those bases 
that fit this category.  The BRAC process looks across all military bases for cost savings 
and military value based on a 20-year force structure plan, therefore encapsulating 
much more than sea level rise criteria.  As this policy proposal focuses on adding sea 
level rise to this criteria, the analysis is also narrowed as the overall installation 
considerations in BRAC are too expansive to address in this paper.    
The last BRAC round, authorized in 2005, was much more costly and expansive 
than previous BRAC rounds, with implementation costs upwards of $35 billion from the 
initially planned implementation costs of $21 billion.68  However, this proposal’s $5 
billion cap on implementation costs meaning the Department is limited to only critical 
installation closures and realignments to account for military value and cost savings.  
Authorizing this BRAC round would enable the Department to make decisions to directly 
address the issue of sea level rise and achieve the policy goal of eliminating the most 
critical vulnerabilities, whether through moving these bases or closing them completely.  
Instead of ad-hoc emergency supplemental spending and individual installation budget 
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requests to address recurring flooding and sea level rise, a BRAC round would ensure 
unnecessary spending is prevented and strategic adaptation choices are made, thus 
optimizing the efficiency of this proposal. 
State and local governments and their residents benefit economically from military 
installations.  According to one study of the local economic impact of the 2005 round of 
Base Realignment and Closures, installations serves as local employment hubs, raise 
regional income levels, and brings military families to the area among other economic 
stimuli.69  Closing these bases due to a variety of reasons can lead to major job losses; 
while numbers vary greatly, the BRAC study found that Connecticut, for example, 
experienced a net job loss of over 8,500 positions.70   Yet most recurrent savings from 
past rounds of BRAC are from civilian job cuts, especially the volume of cuts that are the 
consequence of complete closure.71   
The elimination of the independent commission that assesses the Department’s 
recommendations and administers public hearings on the potential socioeconomic 
impact of closing a military base would expedite the decision-making process, which has 
about six months, including four months of deliberations based on previous BRAC 
rounds.72  This, however would lead to a BRAC assessment based on military value and 
DoD cost savings without input from local stakeholders on the second and third order 
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effects of base closure.  These civilian effects are significant economic factors, and a lack 
of civilian participation in the process is a point of considerable issues regarding equity. 
Despite the expedited decision-making process for this proposed BRAC round, it 
would likely not fulfill the established timeline for completion.  Previous rounds of BRAC 
have demonstrated that the transfer and disposal of DOD real property is complex and 
often does not fit in the six-year implementation window within statute.  Figure 4 shows 
the acreage that remains to be deposed from previous BRAC rounds.  
 
Figure 4. BRAC Acreage Disposed of and Not Yet Disposed 73 
 
Leaving property remaining to be deposed for future decades could cause significant 
environmental damage if environmental cleanup requirements are not fulfilled prior to 
flooding or inundation.  The 2030 completion timeline would also be delayed if included 
in the FY20 NDAA due to the 2024 completion timeline for the development of a DoD 
climate projection tool and 100% installation risk assessment of this policy.   
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While each installation would have to be individually assessed as to the exact costs 
of improving this resiliency, it is likely to be very costly, especially for those most 
vulnerable.  Nevertheless, the installations chosen to not be closed during the BRAC 
round would likely require adaptation measures.  The cost of resiliency would be much 
less expensive than the costs of installation infrastructure repair or replacement after 
flooding or recurring inundation.  In the Department of the Navy’s report FY20 
Justification of Budget Estimates, the Navy requests $48.9 million for dry dock flood 
protection improvements including a floodwall and other measures at Naval Support 
Station Norfolk, the largest naval station in the world.74  While noting that significant 
flooding will increase over time, the Navy’s budget request justification states, “Making 
safe a nuclear submarine overhauled in a dry dock from potential flooding due to 
approaching storms is a costly procedure which significantly impacts shipyard 
operations. Significant damage to the inside of a nuclear submarine could reach $100 
million to $400 million dollars to repair if flooded […] Additionally, flood damage to the 
dry dock structure or its support utilities and facilities could substantially impact the 
ability to restore repair operations…”75  While this request cites “impending storms” as 
the cause for flooding, it also states it is within the 100-year floodplain and, “the risk of 
significant flooding […] will continue to increase over the years.”76  This budget request 
states that leaving the dry dock vulnerable to rising sea levels leaves critical 
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infrastructure vulnerable to damage at an exponentially higher cost than the 
preventative measure.   
This case demonstrates that although these resiliency costs will likely require a 
significant increase in budget authority to address sea level rise and associated recurring 
or permanent flooding, the costs of not making these modifications have the potential 
to incur unacceptable costs to the Department.  Based on this case, the $48.9 million 
cost of sea level rise resiliency versus $100-400 million repair and replacement costs is 
on a ratio of 1:2 to 1:10.  A report by the Union of Concerned Scientists note that 128 
coastal installations in the U.S. would be threatened by a 3-foot increase in sea level. 
Out of these 128, 43% are naval installations valued at $100 billion.77  Expanding these 
cost ratios to all coastal installations in the U.S. and its territories, the expense of flood 
resiliency is immensely less than taking no preventative measures.  The Department of 
Defense has a strong fiduciary responsibility to the American taxpayer, and has every 
interest in optimizing its own buying power to ensure no funds are taken away from its 
primary missions to pay the consequence of significant damage or total inundation of 
these installations.  Therefore, proper planning and budgeting to implement these 
preventative sea level rise resiliency measures is beneficial for all despite the significant 
costs.  
Addressing off-base civilian infrastructure vulnerabilities requires integrated 
planning of DoD with state and local governments to ensure all external factors are 
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accounted for in resiliency plans.  The cost-sharing mechanism between the Department 
of Defense and state and local governments for resiliency projects in this policy does 
serve as a partial solution to incorporating civilian infrastructure into DoD efforts while 
ensuring resiliency efforts are not duplicated.  Additionally, the cost-sharing allows for a 
win-win for both parties which share the strong mutual interest of protecting main 
roads and infrastructure the installation and the surrounding community mutually 
depend on.  Additionally, many vulnerable coastal installations such as Hunter Air Force 
Base (AFB), Langley AFB, Bolling AFB, Washington Navy Yard, MCRD Parris Island, and 
Naval Station Norfolk surround communities with high percentages of black and Latino 
residents and high poverty rates.78  These types of communities are more vulnerable to 
the effects of climate stressors such as flooding events due to poor housing quality, 
community isolation, and cultural barriers.79  While land loss and structural damage to 
installations themselves account for billions of dollars of replacement costs, the regional 
economic harm only adds to the costs associated with sea level rise for coastal 
installations. 
This cost sharing carries the additional and obvious benefit of enhancing 
affordability of preventative resiliency projects for off-base critical civilian 
infrastructure.  Nevertheless, already-strained state and local government budgets may 
not be able to afford their required percentage of resiliency costs unless revenue-raising 
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mechanisms are adjusted, such as higher taxes for local residents.  The federal 
government would likely have to subsidize some of the infrastructure projects if they 
are of national security concern.  This provision is already in the aforementioned 
Defense Community Infrastructure Program (DCIP) but if the Department made a 
sweeping effort to improve installation resiliency as prescribed in this policy, this federal 
funding would have to be included in the federal budget.80   Yet the Department also 
has limited resources available for resiliency modifications to installations, and will have 
to prioritize the installations requiring resources to protect against sea-level rise based 
on the DoD Mission Assurance governance of assessing risks to critical infrastructure.  
This poses an equity issue with the surrounding cities and towns of installations, as 
some local governments will be protected and not others.  Moreover, some 
communities surrounding installations will be more vulnerable than others to the 
impacts of sea level rise as aforementioned.  However, resource decisions would be 
based on national security concerns and not economic or human welfare concerns of 
local authorities, or the actual localities that are most vulnerable to damage from sea 
level rise to include complete inundation.    
Due to the immense costs outlined in this analysis, adding a budget line item for 
these specific costs could be an effective way of tracking overall costs of DoD climate 
change resiliency projects.  Requesting funds separately from the Facilities, 
Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization budget that faces a backlog of over $116 
                                                          





billion would circumvent this funding barrier.81  Since these costs would be tracked 
separately, Congress could be incentivized to fund these specific sea level rise resiliency 
projects with the knowledge of the long-term costs if these measures are not fully 
funded.   And as aforementioned the overall long-term cost savings deter from sharp 
budget crises due to the infrastructure damage projected to come if no action is taken. 
Yet even though the cost savings is estimated to be significant, this request would 
annually pull funds from other missions within the DoD base budget.  The Department is 
already undergoing a so-called “night-court,” cutting programs rapidly in preparation for 
the FY21 budget request to pay for military modernization efforts related to competing 
with China and Russia.82  One SASC staffer said of the Secretary’s initiative, “We’ve been 
saying a lot of the right things for a long time. The question is whether we can 
implement the things we say are important. Buying Thing 1 means you have to divest 
from Thing 2.”83  The same agonizing, long process would have to be applied to 
spending on base resiliency measures to find funding, choosing between long-term cost 
savings and other urgent initiatives- proving to be an equity issue as well as a fiscal 
issue.  Separating these costs from the Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and 
Modernization budget does not necessarily create an expedited funding mechanism.   
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III. Political Analysis 
As the Ranking Member of the SASC Subcommittee on Readiness and Management 
Support, you would be an excellent representative to propose and advocate for this 
proposal.  There are several advantages and disadvantages to such a sweeping proposal 
to address the fiscal exposure and reduction of military readiness due to sea level rise 
on U.S. military installations.  Addressing sea level rise is rooted in climate change, a 
topic of much debate and diverging views of its severity and even existence based on 
party association.  The political climate of discussion the issue is nearly impossible to 
circumvent when assessing the feasibility of support of policies addressing the impact of 
climate change from a variety of stakeholders.  Additionally, overtime DOD BRAC has 
become an extremely political issue as it directly affects local communities and 
economies. 
The view of climate change amongst the American public varies greatly based on 
political ideology.  The Department of Defense is funded by taxpayer dollars, and 
therefore Americans hold a vested interest in the Department’s activities as the largest 
recipient of discretionary funding.  As discussed in the history & background section of 
this paper, the view of climate change has only become more divergent over time 
between Democrats and Republicans.  Democrats increasingly view climate change as 
an important issue that should be actioned by Congress and the administration while 
Republican views stay relatively stagnant.  Figure 5 demonstrates Democratic views that 




47% in 2008 to 67%, a 20 point increase; Republicans holding the same view slightly 
grew by 6 points, from 15% to 21%, in the same time period.84 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of Adults Who Say Dealing with Global Climate Change should be a 
Top Priority for the President and Congress 85 
 
These gaps in opinion tend to narrow when focusing on coastal communities and 
current effects of climate change, many of which have seen damage from “superstorm” 
hurricanes in the 21st century firsthand and are attuned to the fact that sea level rise will 
increase vulnerabilities to floods and storm surges.  A Pew Research Center 2018 
analysis found that 67% of Americans who live within 25 miles of a coastline say that 
climate change is affecting their local community at least some, compared with 50% of 
those who live 300 miles or more from the coast.86 
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A recent study by the Journal of Science Communications shows, however, that 
public perception of the threat climate change poses to environmental and national 
security concerns is highly influenced by the source of climate change messaging, 
whether concern is expressed by Democratic party leader, a Republican party leader, 
climate scientists, or U.S. military leaders.  After conducting a survey experiment 
quoting the various sources with concerns on climate change and measuring public 
reaction, the researchers conclude, “We find that the presence of military leaders as a 
source of a pro-climate appeal can significantly strengthen its persuasive impact, 
especially in the case of an appeal emphasizing the effects of climate change on U.S. 
national security.”87 They also concluded the wider claim that when climate concerns 
endorsed or voiced by military leaders and Republican Party leaders can enhance the 
impact of the request for climate action. 88  Therefore in order for the public, especially 
Republican Americans, to support this policy, military leaders and party leaders will have 
to openly support this bill and explain its advantages for the American taxpayer.   
 The Republican Party as a whole have largely neglected the issue of climate 
change or denied its existence entirely due to actions addressing the issue being, as 
previously mentioned, in contradiction to conservative ideology.   Currently, 150 
Republican members of the 116th Congress deny the scientific consensus on climate 
change, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe (R-OK).89  
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Despite long standing scientific consensus on the human activity cause of climate 
change, and general consensus as to the grave current and future impact of the issue, 
Republican messaging by members of Congress, conservative think tanks such as the 
Heritage Foundation, and conservative media have expressed climate change is a hoax 
or highly exaggerated by the Democratic party.  This is largely due to strong lobbying by 
business leaders, especially those in the fossil fuel industry, to block climate legislation 
that would harm the operations or revenue of their business.90  This has led many 
conservative Americans to be skeptical of climate change, and likely less willing to 
support the use of taxpayer dollars on addressing the issue.  This messaging also aligns 
with the Trump administration’s notion to deny the issue, and is the reported reason for 
the elimination of the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change with the mission to plan and 
develop policy discussions on the issue, established in 2009 during the Obama 
administration.91  Supporting this sea level rise vulnerability policy would be a 
statement of fact on the realities of climate change the serious impact it poses on the 
U.S. military; such statement would contradict historical and current Republican claims 
about climate change.   
On the other hand, this action by the Department would be advantageous for 
Democrats that have been voicing concerns over these issues for years. Senator Warren 
as a member of the SASC would ask military leaders within their testimony to, as 
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previously mentioned, publicly acknowledge the potential harm brought to military 
readiness due to climate change.92  This is a democratic attempt to reach across the 
aisle and provoke a sense of national unity in throwing support behind addressing a 
common enemy, climate change and sea level rise.  Moreover, climate change action 
implemented by military leaders and gaining support from both Democrat and 
Republican members would enable Congressional Democrats to make progress on their 
long-sought climate change agenda, which has been mired by politics.  The Democratic 
climate change agenda is additionally backed by independent Congressional Agencies 
such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which has continued to place on 
the GAO High Risk List the item of “Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure 
by Better Managing Climate Risks” due to the requirement for Government 
transformation and continued lack of administration progress in fulfilling GAO 
recommendations.93  Other GAO reports previously mentioned have cited the need for 
better integrating climate change projections into military installation plans and DoD 
guidance, and this policy would fulfill those recommendations for sea level rise.   
In the middle of this political party debate are Department leaders themselves.  
Military leadership and staff often attest to serving for national defense and attempt to 
stay out of politics as much as possible.  However, as seen from the aforementioned 
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cancellation of the Navy Climate Change Task Force, pressure from the administration 
cannot be avoided, and in this case the Commander-in-Chief is a climate change denier.  
Although administration officials would likely prefer to quietly address these issues due 
to political controversy over addressing them, many in-office representatives including 
Service Secretaries, Secretary Jim Mattis, and the Chief Installations Official, Honorable 
Niemeyer publicly expressed the issues of sea level rise risks to installations in public 
congressional testimony.94  Moreover, retired military officials, no longer expected to 
remain silent, have proven particularly candid actors about the infrastructure risks to 
sea level rise.  Several retired generals and officials like John Conger, the former 
Principal Deputy Defense Comptroller, have founded and chaired think tanks on the 
national security implications of climate change to include organizations like Mr. 
Congers, The Center for Climate and Security, and others like the American Security 
Project.  These organizations synchronize policy positions on this issue by concerned 
former military officers concerned. In March 2019, under the suspicion that the White 
House was considering forming a committee on denying climate science, a position 
paper signed by 58 former military and national security officials expressed their 
concern and condemnation of such a committee.95  These actors strongly support 
improving military readiness by addressing sea level rise, and continue to inform 
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Congressional leaders as subject matter experts and inform the public about the issue 
via reports, publications, and media releases. 
 Yet just as the American public converges on the threat of the issue in coastal 
communities, Republican Party leaders in those areas are increasingly pressured to 
support climate change action by their constituents.  In the state of Florida with some of 
the largest stretches (1,350 miles) of coastline in the country, GOP leaders like Governor 
Rick DeSantis, state representative Chris Fowles, and Congressman Matt Gaetz all have 
spoken out on the issue of climate change and sea level rise despite national Republican 
leanings.  In a recent survey of 3,700 midterm voters in Florida, 46% responded as “very 
concerned” about climate change.96  According to a former political science professor at 
the University of South Florida, “republicans have figured out that if you get caught 
crossways on the environment, you could very well lose an election. That’s how 
important the issue is to Floridians of all stripes.”97   
 This pressure on GOP representatives expands to other southeast coastal states 
like Georgia and South Carolina, although Florida’s Republican Representative Francis 
Rooney co-chairs the House Climate Solutions Caucus with a Floridian Democratic 
counterpart, Rep. Ted Deutch.  The caucus, established in 2016, is the only bipartisan 
Congressional Caucus focused on discussing the issue of climate change and introducing 
bipartisan legislation.  Caucus members include 23 House Republicans and 41 House 
Democrats, proving the issue has the potential for further bipartisan work.  As figure 5 
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shows, DoD coastal installations that have or will be affected by sea level rise spread 
across various Congressional districts in every coastal state. 
 
                   
 
Figure 6. Relative Sea-Level Change Trends & Military Installations in Coastal 
Congressional Districts98 
 
Another part of this policy that is extremely political is the Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) process.   Your subcommittee is the proponent for BRAC oversight.  The 
last BRAC round of 2005 was not received well by Congress, as it was seen as DoD taking 
advantage of the process to achieve DoD force management objectives over total cost 
savings.99  Moreover, Congressmen experience immense pressure from their 
constituents to block any measures that would close bases in their district that brings 
jobs and business to the area.  This policy would remove the independent commission 
from the decision-making process, which was initially built into the process to eliminate 
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these political pressures. It would be consistent with previous comments of yours to 
support the elimination of this commission, as you have stated, “The Pentagon has the 
province to make recommendations on excess capacity, and voters will hold us 
accountable”  and previously rejected new BRAC rounds due to viewing the 
independent commission as parochial and unnecessary.100 
This would align with the Department’s recurring request for a new BRAC round, 
along with the broader defense community.  Thirty-eight defense think tank scholars 
previously wrote a letter the Secretary of Defense and Congressional leaders urging for 
base closures due to cost savings for the Department and opportunity to reform and 
downsize its civilian workforce and costly excess infrastructure.101 This defense 
community includes your SASC colleagues, as former Chairman McCain and Ranking 
Member Reed introduced the amendment to the FY18 NDAA that this BRAC proposal is 
based on.  This proposal includes the $5 billion cap on implementation costs, which 
would resolve BRAC concerns Congress currently has based on the 2005 BRAC round. 
Another important feature of this policy is the effect on your own state of 
Virginia.  As seen from Figure 6, Virginia is one of the high-vulnerability states as it is 
projected to undergo several feet of sea level rise by 2100.  Naval Station Norfolk, the 
largest U.S. naval base in the world, is currently facing severe challenges of sinking 
elevation, high rates of sea level rise, and recurring flooding that will likely lead to 
permanent inundation.  The economy of Virginia relies on this base to provide 
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thousands of jobs to Virginia residents along with important naval military value; 
therefore, the base commander along with state and local officials have worked 
together to address the issue through a comprehensive independent assessment and 
ongoing maintenance and construction efforts.   As Figure 7 shows, over 50% of 
residents in all Congressional Districts of Virginia believe Congress should do more to 
address global warming, with that number generally increasing as the District is closer to 
the shoreline. 
 
Figure 7. Virginia Constituents on Whether Congress Should Do More to Address Climate 
Change102 
  
The majority of residents of Virginia would likely support this policy as it confronts 
issues they are concerned about head-on.  The region of Hampton Roads, which 
includes Naval Station Norfolk, is one of the most advanced installations in terms of 
addressing sea-level rise and conducting an expansive assessment of possible actions.  
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Therefore, the requirements in this policy to adopt a DoD sea level rise assessment tool 
would be redundant for current utilization, although it could save the cost of 
independent assessments in the future.  Despite this inconvenience, specifically funding 
the Defense Community Infrastructure Program at $100 million, which was originally 
proposed by your Congressional Virginia counterpart, Representative Elaine G. Luria (2nd 
District, Virginia) is expected to be supported by the 2nd District and the state as a 
whole.  Supporting this bill would be consistent with your past record calling for DoD 
action on the issue and expressing concern.  In a SASC hearing on extreme weather 
impacts on DoD installations, you noted, “We had a very well attended hearing in 
Hampton Roads now nearly 2 years ago, very bipartisan Congressional delegation 
talking about sea level rise and the effect on Norfolk and other bases, Langley and 
others in the area. And it was pretty sobering, and we started thinking about, if there’s a 
future BRAC round or any kind of, you know, physical base rationalization, that’s got to 
be a vulnerability that people would be concerned about.”103 
 Residents in Hampton Roads as well as their Congressional representatives have 
recently raised concerns on the possibility of a new BRAC due to the economy’s 
dependence on bases. For example, military spending accounted for 42 percent of the 
region’s gross domestic product in 2017.104  Nevertheless, your state has led much of 
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the efforts to proactively address sea level rise vulnerabilities, as the community and the 
installation leadership have joined together to produce a comprehensive vulnerability 
assessment with coordination by the Hampton Roads Military and Federal Facilities 
Alliance.  When asked about the possibility of a new BRAC round, the Executive Director 
of this Alliance stated, “We don’t wait for Congress to approve a BRAC before getting at 
[…] issues; we get at them as soon as they’re identified.  By dealing with them in the 
moment, we are as prepared as possible if Congress approves another round […]. We 
want the conditions surrounding our military installations to be so good that the 
Defense Department would move additional forces here from other areas.”105  
IV. Recommendation 
Although significant political divide impedes Congressional legislation attempting to 
address the impact of climate change, supporting the Rising Tides Defense Resiliency 
and Readiness Act would be politically beneficial to you and addresses tangible 
challenges of your constituents.  This proposal is aligned with the stated values of the 
residents of Virginia  and you as their representative in terms of addressing climate 
change resiliency, supporting our national security and military, and supporting a new 
BRAC round that puts responsibility directly with DoD and Congress.  Your state of 
Virginia is one of the most vulnerable states to sea level rise inundation, specifically the 
Hampton Roads area that holds over 16 military bases, including the largest naval base 
in the world.  Making every effort to address these challenges at the federal level 
                                                          





directly benefits the bases and surrounding communities in Virginia.  The Defense 
Infrastructure Program was championed by your Virginian colleague, Representative 
Luria, and would directly assist the already significant measures that have been 
implemented by the Hampton Roads installations and surrounding communities. 
The overall goals of this policy are to complete sea level rise vulnerability 
assessments for 100% of military installations in the United States and its territories and 
that zero assessed installations, by 2030, will have land loss of 20% or greater projected 
for year 2050.  Although this policy will required large upfront costs from the Defense 
Department’s base budget, the long-term cost savings make these actions necessary.  
Addressing the immense financial implications of after-the-fact installation repair and 
replacement is estimated to cost well over $100 billion over the coming decades.106  
Long-term planning efforts toward increasing sea level rise resiliency is more effective 
than the current state of reactionary and inconsistent efforts by Congress and the 
Department.  This planning provides the mechanism authorizing Congressional 
appropriators to distribute adaptation costs year over year in the annual budget cycle 
instead of supporting DoD supplemental funding requests for infrastructure repair and 
replacement.  This ultimately saves dollars for the Department, preventing the diversion 
of funds to installation repair and replacement that ultimately harm the ability to 
support military missions. 
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The successful completion of the stated policy goals is reasonably possible through 
the outlined mechanism, despite likely not being implemented by the 2030 timeline.  
This policy will enable the use of vetted climate projections across small, intermediate, 
and major fixed installations will ensure the accurate identification of those installations 
with the most mission-critical need of resiliency modifications for long-term planning 
and budgeting prioritization.  A BRAC round would serve as a comprehensive 
mechanism to address fixed installations where modifications would be too costly or 
impractical while funding adaption projects for the rest of the Department’s overall 
high-risk real estate portfolio. 
If DoD fully implements the provisions of the policy, the issue of sea level rise for 
coastal areas will, of course, not go away.  However, these five-fold measures could 
reduce the operational and fiscal risk of significant damage or total inundation of some 
coastal installations. You as a member of Congress have an opportunity to reform U.S. 
climate policy with this DoD initiative.  With successful implementation of this policy, 
the Department will have installations that are able to support national security efforts 
for the next century.   Setting forth the process for the Defense Department to address 
sea level rise as an issue of military readiness and fiscal exposure will save taxpayer 
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